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Abstract—Dynamic charging is an emerging technology that
allows an electric vehicle (EV) to charge its battery while moving
along the road. Dynamic charging charges the EV’s battery
through magnetic induction between the receiving coils attached
to the EV’s battery and the wireless charging pads embedded
under the roadbed and operated by Pad Owners (POs). A key
challenge in dynamic charging is billing, which must consider
the fact that the charging service happens while the EV is
moving on the road, and should allow for flexible usage plans.
A promising candidate could be the subscription-based billing
model, in which an EV subscribes to an electric utility that has
a business relationship with various POs that operate charging
sections. The POs report charging information to the utility of
the EV, and at the end of each billing cycle, the EV receives a
single bill for all its dynamic charging sessions from the utility.
Overshadowing its advantages, a major shortcoming of such
a solution is that the utility gets access to the EVs’ mobility
information, invading thus the location privacy of the EVs.
To enable subscription based billing for dynamic charging, in
this paper we propose Janus, a privacy-preserving billing protocol
for dynamic EV charging. Janus uses homomorphic commitment
and blind signatures with attributes to construct a cryptographic
proof on the charging fee of each individual dynamic charging
session, and allows the utility to verify the correctness of the EV’s
total bill without learning the time, the location, or the charging
fee of each individual charging session of the EV. Our Python-
based implementation shows that the real-time computational
overhead of Janus is less than 0.6 seconds, which is well within
the delay constraint of the subscription-based billing model, and
makes Janus an appealing solution for future dynamic charging
applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic charging is an emerging technology that enables
charging electric vehicles’ (EVs) batteries on the go. Dynamic
charging works by installing a series of short charging pads
under the road, which together form a charging section. While
a charging pad would be in the order of tens of centimeters
long, a typical charging sections could be several kilometers
long. The EV has receiving coils attached to its battery, and as
it drives through the charging section, the magnetic induction
between the coil on the EV and the coils in the charging pad
enable to charge the EV’s battery. Dynamic charging provides
several benefits including increasing the driving range of the
EV and reducing its battery size, as the EV can charge its
battery while moving [13].
In lack of physical contact and due to mobility, a significant
challenge in dynamic charging is billing. In static charging
where the EV stops at a charging station for minutes, the
driver can make the payment for the charging session at the
point-of-sale [2]. For dynamic charging such a billing model
is impractical, as the EV is on the move while the battery
charging happens. A more appealing billing model for dynamic
charging is the subscription-based billing model, which is
similar in spirit to today’s cellular service: the EV subscribes
to a utility who has business relationship with various Pad
Owners (POs) that operate charging sections. At the end of
each billing cycle, the EV receives a single bill for all its
dynamic charge sessions in the past billing cycle from its
utility. The EV then settles the bill with its utility and the
utility settles its bills with the POs.
The subscription-based billing model provides several ad-
vantages for the EV owner: (i) with a single entity having a
complete view of all the EV’s charging activities, including
charging at home, at parking lots, at commercial charging
stations, and dynamic charging on the road, it enables value
added services such as battery health monitoring; (ii) it allows
to the EV to be treated as one of the user’s home appliances;
and (iii) it enables receiving a flexible pricing plan. Having a
complete view of the EV’s charging activities allows the utility
to better manage the charging demands and to reduce peak
load, while the ability to treat the EV as a home appliance
enables flexibility in pricing plans. For instance, if the user
chooses to join the vehicle-to-grid (V2G) program that helps
the utility to reduce peak load, the utility could apply discounts
to the EV’s dynamic charging bill. The subscription-based
billing model also enables a flexible pricing plan similar to
the data plan model in today’s cellular service. For example,
the EV could purchase a plan of 1000 miles from the utility,
and the EV can use dynamic charging anywhere anytime to
recharge its battery up to 1000 miles of total driving distance.
Subscription-based billing does, however, pose a significant
threat to the EVs’ location privacy. The naive approach where
the EV or the PO submits to the utility the location and
time of each charging session in order for the utility to
calculate the total bill would allow the utility to learn the
exact time and location of each dynamic charging session.
This information could possibly reveal interests, driving habits,
health conditions and economic status, which clearly invades
the EV owner’s privacy. Thus, to make subscription-based
billing models applicable for dynamic EV charging, it is
essential for the billing protocol to preserve the EV’s location
privacy. Existing solutions developed for privacy-preserving
toll pricing [4], [9], [15], [18], public transportation [19] and
static charging [2] cannot be applied to the use case of dynamic
EV charging, partly due to the different nature of the service
and due to mobility.
In this paper we propose Janus, a privacy-preserving billing
protocol for dynamic charging of electric vehicles. A key
feature of Janus is that in the bill calculation process the utility
is not able to learn when and where an EV has used dynamic
charging. Janus achieves this by embedding a homomorphic
commitment of the price for each charging session as attributes
in blind signatures signed by the utility. The cryptographic
constructions allow the EV and the PO to compute their
total bill locally, without involving any trusted third party,
and prove the correctness of the total bill to the utility. We
implement Janus in Python based on petlib [1] and evaluate its
execution time on a combination of Raspberry Pi and Macbook
hardware and software. Our results show that all billing process
computations can be done within 0.6 seconds, which is well
within the delay constraint for the considered billing model.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows: (i)
we propose a privacy-preserving billing protocol, Janus, for
dynamic charging of electric vehicles under the subscription-
based billing model 1; to our best knowledge this is the
first privacy-preserving billing protocol proposed for dynamic
charging; (ii) we provide experimental results from a Python
implementation that demonstrate the practical feasibility of
Janus, (iii) we provide an analysis of the location privacy
provided by Janus and, in general, by any protocol revealing
aggregate information; and (iv) we provide a comparison of
Janus with other privacy-preserving billing solutions such as
electronic toll pricing and digital cash.
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. In Section II
we describe the system model and assumptions. In Section III
we introduce key security building blocks used in Janus. In
Section IV we summarize the notations, and in Section V we
describe the Janus protocol. In Section VI we evaluate the
running time and message overhead of Janus. In Section VII
we analyze the security and privacy properties of Janus. We
discuss related solutions in Section VIII, and in Section IX we
review related work. We conclude the paper in Section X.
II. BACKGROUND AND SYSTEM MODEL
A. Dynamic EV Charging
We define a dynamic charging section to be a road segment
under which the wireless charging pads are installed. To
facilitate power management, a charging section is typically
a few kilometers long [8]. Within the charging section, short
wireless charging pads (e.g., 40 cm long) are placed con-
secutively under the roadbed, with some tens of centimeters
between adjacent pads. For efficiency, each charging pad can
be individually switched on and off, independent of other
1Although Janus is designed for dynamic charging, it can also be applied
to static charging of EVs, i.e., one could think of each static charging station
as a dynamic charging section.
Fig. 1: Illustration of Dynamic Charging Section and Dynamic
Charging Session.
charging pads, and a charging pad should only be switched
on when there is an EV above it, and should switch off
immediately after the EV moves away.
We consider that each dynamic charging section is operated
by some Pad Owner (PO). The PO may either produce elec-
tricity itself, or may purchase electricity from some electricity
provider. A PO can own multiple dynamic charging sections,
and there can exist multiple POs operating different dynamic
charging sections in the same area.
We define a dynamic charging session between an EV e
and a PO p to be the contiguous time period starting from the
moment that EV e starts charging its battery from a dynamic
charging section operated by PO p, until the moment that EV
e stops charging from that charging section. During a single
dynamic charging session the EV continuously charges its
battery by moving over a series of wireless charging pads in
the dynamic charging section. Figure 1 illustrates a dynamic
charging section and a dynamic charging session.
B. Subscription-based Billing Model
The subscription-based billing model we consider is similar
to the billing model used in today’s cellular services. The
billing model involves three types of entities: utilities, EVs,
and POs. Following this model an EV pays a single bill to its
contracted utility once every billing cycle rather than making
individual payments for each dynamic charging session to the
PO that owns the charging section.
The billing model consists of two operations: fee negotia-
tion and fee aggregation.
• Fee negotiation happens prior to each dynamic charg-
ing session. The EV and the PO negotiate and agree
on the charging fee that the EV should pay for the
upcoming dynamic charging session.
• Fee aggregation happens once at the end of each
billing cycle. The EV calculates and submits to its
utility its total fee that it should pay to its utility, and
the PO calculates and submits to the utilities the total
fee that it should receive from them for charging their
contracted EVs.
We illustrate the proposed billing model in Figure 2. EV 1
receives dynamic charging only once from PO A, and the
2
charging fee for that charging session is $3. EV 2 is involved
in one dynamic charging session with PO A for $4, and
another charging session with PO B for $5. From the utility’s
perspective, the total bill for EV 1 would be $3, and the total
bill for EV 2 would be $9 (= 4 + 5). Since PO A provided
dynamic charging to both EV 1 and EV 2, the total fee that
the utility should pay to PO A is $7 (= 3 + 4). PO B only
provided dynamic charging to EV 2, and receives $5 from the
utility.
C. Communication Model
We make the reasonable assumption that the EV can com-
municate wirelessly with its utility and with each PO through
WiFi, DSRC, or a cellular network, and there is a secure
connection (e.g., TLS/SSL) between the utilities and each PO
through a broadband network infrastructures. We assume that
prior to each charging session, the EV establishes a secure
communication channel with the PO, e.g., by negotiating a
temporary session key with the PO.
D. Security Model
We assume that the utilities are honest but curious, in that
they faithfully follow the protocol but are interested to infer
the location information of individual EVs. We assume that
in the fee negotiation phase of the subscription-based billing
model, the EV and the PO are able to agree on the fee for each
individual charging session. However, in the fee aggregation
phase at the end of each billing cycle, the EV may have an
incentive to underclaim its total fee that should be paid to its
utility, and the PO may have an incentive to overclaim the total
fees that it should receive from the utilities.
III. SECURITY BUILDING BLOCKS
In this section we describe the security building blocks
used in the construction of Janus.
A. Homomorphic Commitment
A commitment scheme allows a user to bind a secret value
x to a commitmentC. The commitmentC itself is information-
hiding in that C does not reveal any information about x.
Nonetheless, the user can reveal the secret value x and can
prove that C is indeed a commitment of x. One example
of perfect information-hiding commitment is the Pedersen
Fig. 2: Illustration of subscription-based billing model for
dynamic charging. The fees in light-colored boxes beneath the
EVs ($3, $4, $5) are the results of fee negotiation. The fees
in dark-colored boxes above the EVs ($7, $3, $9, $5) are the
results of fee aggregation.
commitment scheme [17]: to commit a value x, the user
chooses a random secret r and computes C = gxhr, where g
and h are public. In order to prove that x is indeed committed
in C, the user reveals x and r, and the verifier computes
C′ = gxhr and checks that C = C′.
A homomorphic commitment scheme additionally allows
one to obtain useful information by operating directly on
commitments, without knowing the secret values in the com-
mitments. A Pedersen commitment can be extended to a
homomorphic commitment as follows: given C1 = g
x1hr1 and
C2 = g
x2hr2 , we define
C1 ⊞ C2 = C1C2 = g
x1+x2hr1+r2 (1)
Note that anyone can compute C1 ⊞ C2, given only C1 and
C2. Later the user can prove that x1 + x2 equals to the
claimed value, without revealing x1 and x2 themselves, by
revealing r1 + r2. In Janus we use Cmt(x1, . . . , xn; r) to
denote a Pedersen commitment with secret values x1, . . . , xn
and commitment opener r.
B. Zero-Knowledge Proof
In a Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) the prover proves to the
verifier possession of certain secret values that satisfy certain
relations. The proof is zero-knowledge in the sense that the
proof itself does not reveal any additional information about
the secret values. We use notation ZK{x : P (x)} to denote
a zero-knowledge proof of secret value x such that x satisfies
the relation P (x). Every variable that appears to the left of the
colon is a secret value only known to the prover, and every
variable that only appears to the right of the colon is public.
For example, the following notation ZK{x, r : gxhr = C}
represents a zero-knowledge proof that the prover knows the
secret value x and the commitment opener r that is used to
form the Pedersen commitment C.
A zero-knowledge proof is interactive if it involves real-
time interaction (e.g., message exchanges) between the prover
and the verifier. One example is the Schnorr Identification
scheme [5], which, given public values g and h, allows the
prover to prove knowledge of value x such that gx = h without
revealing x. One can transform an interactive zero-knowledge
proof into a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZKP)
using the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic [12].
C. Blind Signature with Attributes
A blind signature scheme allows the user to obtain a
signature from the signer while the signer does not learn
the content of the message to be signed. Baldimtsi and
Lysyanskaya extended the definition of blind signature and
introduced the concept of blind signature with attributes [5].
In addition to the message m, the user possesses certain
secret attributes L1, . . . , Ln and commits the attributes in
a commitment C = Cmt(L1, . . . , Ln;R) with commitment
opener R. The commitment C is public while the message m
and the attributes L1, . . . , Ln are only known to the user. A
blind signature with attributes would allow the user to obtain
a signature σ on (m, C˜), where C˜ is a new commitment to the
same attributes L1, . . . , Ln but with a different opening secret
R˜, i.e., C˜ = Cmt(L1, . . . , Ln; R˜). The commitment opener
R˜ of the new commitment C˜ is only known to the user. In
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Janus we use Anonymous Credential Light (ACL) [5] as the
implementation of the blind signature with attributes scheme.
D. Single-Use Anonymous Credentials
An anonymous credential allows the user to prove posses-
sion of the credential without revealing the user’s true identity.
A single-use anonymous credential further guarantees that the
credential can be used at most once. If the user attempts to
spend a single-use credential more than once, the user’s true
identity can be revealed. One way of constructing a single-
use anonymous credential is to use blind signatures with
attributes as described in [5]. To obtain a single-use anonymous
credential, the user first generates a random secret L0, and
constructs a commitment C = Cmt(L0, L1;R). The user then
proves to the signer knowledge of L0, L1, R with respect to
C and obtains a blind signature σ on (m, C˜), where m is
a random message and C˜ = Cmt(L0, L1; R˜). To spend the
credential, the user reveals m, C˜, σ, receives a challenge c
from the verifier, and then reveals the double-spending factor
d = cL1 + L0. The verifier verifies that σ is a valid signature
on (m, C˜). Note that if the user attempts to spend the same
credential twice, the verifier would know d = cL1 + L0 and
d′ = c′L1 + L0, from which the user’s true identity can be
inferred as L1 =
d−d′
c−c′ .
IV. NOTATION
Before we introduce the Janus protocol, we summarize the
key notations.
• H : one-way hash function.
• e: EV’s true identity.
• p: PO’s true identity.
• u: Utility’s true identity.
• (e, p, u, i, j): index of the considered charging session,
which is the i-th charging session of EV e, and the
j-th charging session of PO p with any EV subscribed
to utility u.
• P = P ei = P
p,u
j : the three variables all denote the
same charging fee for a particular charging session
agreed by EV e and PO p.
• Cmt(L0, L1, . . . , Ln;R): Pedersen commitment of
attributes (L0, L1, . . . , Ln) with commitment opener
R.
• pi = NIZK{(x1, . . . , xn) :
P (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym)}: Non-Interactive Zero-
Knowledge proof of knowledge. The prover proves
knowledge of secret values x1, . . . , xn that satisfy the
relation P (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym), where y1, . . . , ym
are public values.
• τei = (sn
e
i , Cˆ
e
i , σˆ
e
i ): single-use anonymous credential
issued by the utility to EV e during the registration
phase.
• snei : a random secret generated by EV e.
• Cˆei : Cˆ
e
i = Cmt(L
e
i , e; Rˆ
e
i ) is a Pedersen commitment
with random secret Lei and EV’s identity e as com-
mitted values.
• Lei : random secret generated by EV e.
• c: challenge used in the double-spending equation
de,p,ui,j .
• de,p,ui,j : d
e,p,u
i,j = c · e + L
e
i is the double-spending
equation that allows identification of the EV’s identity
e if the same single-use credential τei is spent twice.
• σˆei : utility’s ACL signature on (sn
e
i , Cˆ
e
i ).
• (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ): the receipt of EV e.
• σei : utility’s ACL signature on (m
e
i , C˜
e
i ).
• mei : m
e
i = Cmt(e; z
e
i ) is a Pedersen commitment
with the EV’s identity e as the committed value, and
commitment opener zei that is only known to EV e.
• C˜ei : C˜
e
i = Cmt(P
e
i ; R˜
e
i ) is a Pedersen commitment
with the charging fee P ei as the committed value, and
commitment opener R˜ei known to both PO p and EV
e.
• (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ): the receipt of PO p.
• σp,uj : utility’s ACL signature on (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j )
• mp,uj : m
p,u
j = Cmt(p; z
p,u
j ) is a Pedersen commit-
ment with the PO’s identity p as the committed value,
and commitment opener zp,uj that is only known to
PO p.
• C˜p,uj : C˜
p,u
j = Cmt(P
p,u
j ; R˜
p,u
j ) is a Pedersen com-
mitment with the charging fee P p,uj as the committed
value, and commitment opener R˜p,uj only known to
PO p.
V. JANUS PROTOCOL
A. Design Goals and Protocol Overview
Janus is designed to enable privacy-preserving dynamic
EV charging, and as such it has two major design goals:
correctness and privacy.
• Correctness: Janus must allow the utility to verify that
the total fee submitted by the EV and the PO to the
utility in the fee aggregation phase of the billing model
is consistent with the charging fees of each individual
charging session. In particular, the EV should be able
to prove to the utility that it does not underclaim the
total fee, and the PO should be able to prove to the
utility that it does not overclaim the total fee.
• Privacy: Janus should only provide information to
the utility that is needed for settlement, and the
information should not be sufficient to infer location
information of individual EVs. In particular, for each
individual charging session, the time of the charging,
the identity of the PO, and the charging fee for this
individual charging session should be infeasible to
infer for the utility.
To be compatible with subscription-based billing, at a
high level Janus consists of three phases: registration, price
validation, and reconciliation. The purpose and operation of
these phases is as follows.
• The registration phase happens once at the beginning
of each billing cycle between each EV e and its utility
u, where the utility issues N single-use credentials
τe1 , . . . , τ
e
N to EV e. For each dynamic charging ses-
sion the EV will have to spend one unused credential.
• The price validation phase happens at the beginning
of each dynamic charging session (after the EV and
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Fig. 3: Overview of Registration phase of Janus. The above
protocol shows how EV e obtains one single-use anonymous
credential τei = (sn
e
i , Cˆ
e
i , σˆ
e
i ) from its utility. To obtain a total
of N credentials, the EV repeats the above protocol N times
at the beginning of the billing cycle.
the PO have completed fee negotiation and agreed on
the charging fee for the upcoming charging session,
and before the actual charging happens), where EV e,
PO p and utility u run the price validation protocol
described in Section V-C. As a result, EV e obtains
the receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) and PO p obtains the receipt
(mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) on the price P
e
i = P
p,u
j = P from
the utility u, where σei is the utility’s signature on the
pair (mei , C˜
e
i ), and σ
p,u
j is the utility’s signature on
the pair (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j ). The price validation protocol
uses blind signature so that the utility does not learn
either mp,uj or C˜
p,u
j during the signing process. The
receipt proves that both the EV and the PO agreed on
the price P , and the utility’s signature prevents the EV
and the PO from modifying the receipt.
• The reconciliation phase happens once at the end of
the billing cycle. During this phase EV e submits
the total price P e =
∑Me
i=1 P
e
i and all its receipts
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) to the utility, whereM
e is the number of
charging sessions of EV e during the billing cycle. PO
p also submits the total price P p,u =
∑Mp,u
i=1 P
p,u
j and
the validation tokens (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ), where M
p,u
is the number charging sessions provided by PO p to
EVs of utility u. In addition each EV e also needs
to reveal any unused credentials τeMe+1, . . . , τ
e
N to its
utility u.
In what follows we explain these three phases in detail.
B. Registration
The registration phase happens once at the beginning of
each billing cycle. The main purpose of this phase is for the
utility to issue anonymous credentials to the EV that will be
used in the price validation phase. The EV can authenticate
with the utility using its true identity (e.g., its long-term public
key) at the beginning of the registration phase, and thus the
utility knows the EV’s identity during the communication
of the registration phase (but the utility does not learn the
anonymous credentials issued to the EV until the EV spends
them). During the registration phase, each EV e is issued N
credentials for the billing cycle, where N is large enough for
all charging sessions of an arbitrary EV. In practice, to make
sure that an EV will not run out of credentials during the
billing cycle, the number N can be estimated using traffic
statistics and study of EV charging behavior. Note that, since
Janus requires each EV to submit all unused credentials at
the end of the billing cycle (explained later in Section V-D),
it is important that all EVs are issued the same number of
credentials; otherwise the utility can identify the EV according
to the total number of credentials it is issued at the beginning
of the billing cycle.
In Figure 3 we illustrate how EV e obtains a single-use
credential τei = (sn
e
i , Cˆ
e
i , σˆ
e
i ) from the utility as described
in [5]. EV e obtains N credentials by repeating the protocol
N times. The protocol itself consists of three steps.
• Step 1: to obtain the i-th credential, the EV first
generates random secrets snei , L
e
i , and R. sn
e
i is a
serial number that serves as the message to be signed,
and Lei together with the EV’s true identity e serve as
the attribute, as described in Section III-C.
• Step 2: the EV commits Lei and its identity e in the
commitment C = Cmt(Lei , e;R) using secret R.
• Step 3: the EV runs the ACL signing protocol with
the utility as the signer on the message snei and
attribute commitment C. As a result, EV e obtains
Cˆei , Rˆ
e
i , σˆ
e
i , where Cˆ
e
i is a commitment to the same
attributes (Lei , e) but with a different secret Rˆ
e
i , i.e.,
Cˆei = Cmt(L
e
i , e; Rˆ
e
i ), and σˆ
e
i is the utility’s signature
on the pair (snei , Cˆ
e
i ).
Note that during the signing process the utility does not learn
the value of Lei , e or the new commitment Cˆ
e
i , and the output
signature σˆei cannot be linked to this signing session.
C. Price Validation
Price validation happens between the EV and the PO. Note
that when the EV uses the dynamic charging service provided
by some PO, the PO can physically observe the EV at its
charging section, and thus there is no reason to hide the EV’s
location information from the PO. A malicious PO can indeed
disclose the identity of the observed EV to any utility or other
entities. Such malicious PO behavior is out of the scope of
Janus, and thus we consider that the EV trusts the PO not to
disclose the EV’s identity and location to any third party. As
a consequence, we can rely on the PO to act as a proxy and
relay messages between the EV and its utility, and thus the
EV does not communicate directly with the utility during the
price validation phase.
In Figure 4 we illustrate the price validation protocol
through showing the message exchange for the i-th charging
session of EV e in the current billing cycle, which happens to
be the j-th charging session of PO p with any EV subscribed to
utility u. We refer to this dynamic charging session as session
(e, p, u, i, j). Once EV e and PO p have agreed on the price
P for this charging session, EV e records the price P ei = P
and the PO records the price P p,uj = P . The goal of the price
validation phase is to let EV e obtain receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i )
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and PO p to obtain receipt (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) on the price
P ei = P
p,u
j = P from the utility u. To preserve the EV’s
privacy, we rely on the ACL blind signature with attributes [5].
This way, during the signing process, the utility does not learn
the value of the price P , the EV’s identity e, and cannot link
the produced receipts (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) with
the signing session.
The price validation protocol consists of four major steps:
PO preparation, EV preparation, receipt generation, and EV
validation.
1) PO Preparation: In this step, the PO prepares two
commitments of the charging fee P = P ei = P
p,u
j .
• Step 1: PO receives a random nonce n generated by
the utility.
• Step 2: PO generates a random secret zp,uj and com-
mits its identity p in mp,uj = Cmt(p; z
p,u
j ).
• Step 3: PO generates two secrets Rei , R
p,u
j and com-
mits the price P = P ei = P
p,u
j in the commitments
Cei = Cmt(P
e
i ;R
e
i ) and C
p,u
j = Cmt(P
p,u
j ;R
p,u
j ).
• Step 4: PO sends Cei , R
e
i , C
p,u
j , R
p,u
j , n to the EV.
2) EV Preparation: In this step, the EV spends an anony-
mous credential τei and constructs the non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof accordingly.
• Step 1: EV verifies that the two commitments
Cei , C
p,u
j are formed correctly.
• Step 2: EV binds the nonce n generated by the utility
with the two commitments into c = H(n,Cei , C
p,u
j )
using a one-way function H , and constructs the
double-spending equation de,p,ui,j = c · e + L
e
i . The
EV is essentially using c as the challenge to spend its
single-use credential τei = (sn
e
i , Cˆ
e
i , σˆ
e
i ).
• Step 3: EV then generates a random secret zei and
commits its identity e in mei = Cmt(e; z
e
i ).
• Step 4: EV constructs a non-interactive zero-
knowledge proof that (i) it knows the openings to
Cei and C
p,u
j ; and (ii) d
e,p,u
i,j is correctly formed; and
(iii) the single-use credential τei is correctly spent. The
proof-of-knowledge equation is illustrated in eqn. (2).
pie,p,ui,j = NIZK{(Pe, Pp, Re, Rp, Rˆ, e, L) :
Cei = Cmt(Pe;Re) ∧
Cp,uj = Cmt(Pp;Rp) ∧
Cˆei = Cmt(L, e; Rˆ) ∧
de,p,ui,j = H(n,C
e
i , C
p,u
j ) · e+ L}
(2)
• Step 5: EV sends the mei , τ
e
i , d
e,p,u
i,j , pi
e
i to the PO.
3) Receipt Generation: In this step, the PO obtains two
receipts by running two instances of ACL signature generation
algorithm with the utility.
• Step 1: PO verifies the validity of τei and pi
e
i , and sends
to the utility Cei , C
p,u
j , τ
e
i , d
e,p,u
i,j , pi
e,p,u
i,j .
• Step 2: utility verifies that the credential τei is valid,
and pie,p,ui,j is correct.
• Step 3: utility runs the ACL signing algorithm as the
signer with the PO on (mei , C
e
i ) and (m
p,u
j , C
p,u
j )
respectively. In the end the PO obtains receipt
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), R˜
e
i , receipt (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ), and
R˜p,uj , where C˜
e
i = Cmt(P
e
i ; R˜
e
i ) is a commitment
to the same attributes P ei as C
e
i , but with a different
secret R˜ei , and σ
e
i is the utility’s ACL signature on
(mei , C˜
e
i ). Similarly, C˜
p,u
j = Cmt(P
p,u
j ; R˜
p,u
j ) is a
commitment to the same attributes as Cp,uj , and σ
p,u
j
is the utility’s ACL signature on (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j ).
• Step 4: PO verifies that (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) and
(mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) are formed correctly, and the
commitment openers R˜ei , R˜
p,u
j are valid.
• Step 5: PO stores its own receipt (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j )
together with R˜p,uj
• Step 6: PO sends the other receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) and
the corresponding commitment opener R˜ei to the EV.
Note that during the signing process the utility does not learn
the value of mei , C˜
e
i ,m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j .
4) EV Validation: In the validation step the EV receives
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), R˜
e
i from the PO, and verifies that σ
e
i is indeed
the utility’s signature on (mei , C˜
e
i ), and that R˜
e
i opens the
commitment C˜ei = Cmt(m
e
i ; R˜
e
i ).
D. Reconciliation
The reconciliation phase happens at the end of the billing
cycle. Each EV e computes the total sum that it should pay to
its utility u, and each PO p also computes the total sum that
it should receive each utility u.
Let us consider that in the current billing cycle EV e has
participated in a total of M e dynamic charging sessions (with
any PO). For the ith charging session EV e has the price P ei ,
the price receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), the secret R˜
e
i that opens C˜
e
i ,
and zei that opens m
e
i , for all 1 ≤ i ≤ M
e. EV e computes
the total price
P e =
Me∑
i=1
P ei (3)
and the commitment opener for the homomorphic commitment
Re =
Me∑
i=1
R˜ei (4)
EV e then sends P e, Re together with the receipts (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i )
and zei for all 1 ≤ i ≤M
e to utility u. The utility checks that
• Cmt(P e;Re) = ΠM
e
i=1C˜
e
i
• ∀i,mei = Cmt(e; z
e
i )
• σei is a valid ACL signature on (m
e
i , C˜
e
i ).
As a second step, EV e proves to the utility that it does not
omit any payment by revealing the remaining N−M e unused
6
Fig. 4: Overview of the Price Validation phase of Janus. The figure shows the message exchange for the i-th charging session of
EV e, which happens at a charging section of PO p, and happens to be the j-th time that PO p provides dynamic charging service
to any EV subscribing to utility u. As a result, EV e obtains receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) and PO p obtains receipt (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j )
on the price P ei = P
p,u
j = P from the utility u.
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credentials τeMe+1, . . . , τ
e
N . If all the above verifications suc-
ceed, the utility accepts P e as the correct total sum that EV e
owes the utility for the billing cycle.
The reconciliation phase for the PO is analogous. Consider
that in the current billing cycle PO p has engaged in a total
of Mp,u dynamic charging sessions with any EV subscribed
to utility u, and the fee of the jth session was P p,uj . PO p
constructs P p,u =
∑Mp,u
j=1 P
p,u
j and R
p,u =
∑Mp,u
j=1 R˜
p,u
j , and
sends P p,u, Rp,u together with (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ), z
p,u
j for all
1 ≤ j ≤Mp,u to utility u. The utility checks that
• Cmt(P p,u;Rp,u) = ΠM
p,u
j=1 C˜
p,u
j
• ∀i,mp,uj = Cmt(p; z
p,u
j )
• σp,uj is a valid ACL signature on (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j ).
If all verifications succeed, the utility accepts the value P p,u
as the total sum it owes PO p. Since in the considered billing
model the utility should pay the PO, the PO has no economic
incentive to omit a price value in computing the total sum P p,u.
Therefore, the protocol does not require the PO to prove to the
utility that no price value pp,uj is omitted.
Note that, although the receipts are both generated and
verified by the utility, the utility cannot link the EV’s receipt
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) or the PO’s receipt (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) to the
price validation session (e, p, u, i, j) where the receipts were
constructed. This is because the receipts are constructed using
blind signatures, the verification of which will not reveal the
signing session nor the identity of the signature requester (See
section III-C).
VI. EVALUATION
A. Implementation
We have implemented Janus in Python using the petlib
library [1], which includes an implementation of the ACL
signature scheme. The implementation uses Pederson com-
mitment as the homomorphic commitment scheme and P-224
elliptic curve group. Since the implementation is primarily
meant to evaluate the execution time rather than the communi-
cation delay, we implemented the protocols as a single process
and simplified message passing between different entities as
function calls.
B. Execution Time
The Janus protocol consists of 3 phases, but the registration
and the reconciliation phases are only executed once per billing
cycle, at the beginning and at the end, and rely only on
ACL signatures and homomorphic commitments. The most
complex part of the Janus protocol is the price validation
phase shown in Figure 4, which is executed at the beginning
of each dynamic charging session, and thus we focus on the
execution time of this phase. For the evaluation we consider
a reasonable scenario in which the PO and the utility have
more computational power than the EV, and thus we run the
EV preparation and the EV validation steps on a Raspberry
Pi 2 Model B, which has a 900MHz quad-core ARM Cortex-
A7 CPU and 1GB RAM, and run the PO preparation and the
receipt generation steps on a macbook pro with a 2.7GHz Intel
Fig. 5: Execution time of the price validation protocol. EV
preparation and EV validation are run on a Raspberry Pi 2
Model B. PO preparation and signature generation are run on
a Macbook. Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals.
Core i5 and 8 GB RAM. We repeat the execution for 20 times,
and we show the average execution time of the various steps
in Figure 5.
Clearly, the most time-consuming operations are included
in the EV preparation step, where the EV constructs the non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof pie,p,ui,j . The signature gener-
ation step, although involving more cryptographic operations,
takes less time to execute since the utility and the PO have
more computational power than the EV. Overall, the price
validation protocol takes less than 0.6 seconds to execute,
which makes it practical for the subscription-based billing
model, even if communication delays are considered.
C. Communication Overhead
Recall that Janus consists of three phases: registration, price
validation, and reconciliation. Both the registration and the
reconciliation phase happen only once per billing cycle, and
the delay constraint on these two phases are very loose. We
therefore are more interested in the communication overhead
of the price validation phase, which happens once per charging
session.
The price validation phase involves two instances of ACL
signature generation, each of which involves 5 message ex-
changes [5]. Nonetheless, the ACL signature generation algo-
rithm is run by the PO and the utility, hence the time needed
for 5 message exchanges is not significant. We thus treat ACL
signature generation as a blackbox, and refer to [5] for its
analysis.
Besides the message exchanges used in the ACL algorithm,
the price validation phase requires only 5 messages. In Table I,
we show the sizes of the messages exchanged in Figure 42. The
numbers correspond to the sizes of the actual python objects
in our implementation. The two largest messages are msg 3
and msg 4, which include the non-interactive zero-knowledge
proof pie,p,ui,j and the EV’s credential τ
e
i . Recall that the price
validation phase during which these message exchanges occur
happens once per charging session, their transmission over
any reasonable wireless communication system would incur
a small transmission time. These experimental results show
2We omitted the message exchanges in the standard ACL signature signing
process.
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that the computational and communication complexity of Janus
make it practical for dynamic EV charging.
Message Size (bytes)
msg 1 28
msg 2 180
msg 3 1117
msg 4 1165
msg 5 833
TABLE I: Message sizes
D. Scalability
In Janus, the EV obtains all its single-use anonymous
credentials τei from the utility during the registration phase.
Issuing one anonymous credential requires running the signing
algorithm of ACL signature, which is time consuming (e.g.,
taking around 1 sec to complete). However, this does not affect
the scalability of the protocol because the registration phase
happens once at the beginning of the billing cycle, where the
EV has several hours or even days to obtain all the anonymous
credentials it needs. Similarly, the reconciliation phase also
happens once every billing cycle, and does not affect the real-
time scalability of Janus.
VII. ANALYSIS
In this section we prove the correctness of Janus and
analyze the location privacy it provides. Throughout the section
we focus on EVs that contracted a particular utility u, and we
denote by E the set of EVs that contracted the considered
utility and by P the set of POs.
A. Security and Privacy Analysis
In this section we review the three phases of Janus, and
analyze the use of security building blocks as well as discuss
what information can be learned in each phase.
During the registration phase, the utility issues anonymous
credentials to EVs. The EV must authenticate itself using its
true identity with the utility at the beginning of the registration
phase, e.g., using its long-term public key. This guarantees
that the Utility will issue the correct number of credentials
to each EV. Although the EV authenticates with the utility
using its true identity during this phase (e.g., using a long-
term public key), the ACL signing algorithm guarantees that
the anonymous credential τei issued to EV e cannot be linked
to the signing session. Therefore, the only information that the
utility learns about EV e during the registration phase is that
the EV has obtained a total of N credentials. Since each EV
obtains the same number of credentials during the registration
phase, the numberN will not provide any useful information to
the utility for inferring the EV’s identity. Finally, credentials
cannot be forged due to the construction based on the ACL
signature.
During the price validation phase, the utility collects
the price commitments Cei , C
p,u
j , and issues EV’s receipt
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) and the PO’s receipt (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) for ses-
sion (e, p, u, i, j). The price P ei = P
p,u
j committed is never
revealed to the utility. Note that the utility learns neither the
messages mei , m
p,u
j , nor the commitments C˜
e
i , C˜
p,u
j in the
receipts at this time, due to the particular construction of the
ACL blind signature (See Section III-C). During this phase, EV
e also spends one single-use anonymous credentials τei . The
utility is only able to verify that the credential is valid and
has not been used before, but cannot infer the EV’s identity
from the anonymous credential. Finally, note that during this
phase EV e does not directly communicate with the utility, and
therefore network-level anonymity (e.g., Tor) is not necessary.
Note that only EV e knows the secret value zei that opens the
commitment mei = Cmt(e; z
e
i ). Since the true identity e of
the EV is committed in mei , and since σ
e
i is a signature on
mei with attributes committed in C˜
e
i , the receipt (m
e
i , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i )
can only be used by EV e and is not useful to an attacker
that steals the receipt. Similarly, the receipt (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j )
can only be used by PO p. The signatures σei and σ
p,u
j used
in the receipts cannot be forged by a third party due to the
construction of ACL.
During the reconciliation phase, the utility learns the total
fee P e and the total number of charging sessions M e of
each contracted EV e, as well as the total fee P p,u and the
total number of charging sessions Mp,u about each PO p. It
also collects the corresponding receipts from each EV e and
each PO p. Janus does not reveal to the utility the fee for
each individual dynamic charging session, neither the charging
sections that an EV has charged its battery at.
B. Correctness
To prove correctness, we have to show that the utility is
able to verify that for each EV e the total charging fee P e
submitted by the EV is indeed the sum of the charging fees
of all charging sessions that EV e participated in, i.e., P e =∑Me
i=1 P
e
i . Similarly, we have to show that utility u is able
to verify that the total charging fee P p,u claimed by PO p is
not more than the sum of the charging fees of all charging
sessions provided by the PO to EVs with a contract with u,
i.e., P p,u ≤
∑Mp,u
j=1 P
p,u
j .
1) EV Cannot Omit Payment: In Janus, the utility does not
compute the total fee owed by the EV, it only verifies that
the total fee is consistent with the receipts, both of which are
submitted by the EV. Naturally a malicious EV may attempt to
underclaim the total fee by intentionally withholding submit-
ting one or multiple receipts (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ). Janus mitigates this
by requiring each EV to spend all of its single-use anonymous
credentials τei . Recall that during the registration phase which
happens once at the beginning of each billing cycle, the utility
issues a total of N single-use credentials τe1 , . . . , τ
e
N to each
EV e. In the price validation phase, in order to receive a receipt
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), EV e must spend one of its unused credentials.
Therefore, if during the reconciliation phase the EV submits
a total of M receipts (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ), 1 ≤ i ≤M
e, the EV must
prove to the utility that it still possesses a total of N −M e
unused credentials. The EV can prove this to the utility by
repeating a simple challenge-response protocol for N −M e
times: each time the EV receives a fresh challenge c from
the utility it has to spend an unused credential by binding
the credential to the value of c, in a way similar to how the
EV binds the price commitments Cei and C
p,u
j in the double-
spending equation de,p,ui,j = H(n,C
e
i , C
p,u
j ) · e + L as we
described in Section V-C. If the EV fails to prove possession
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of N −M e unspent credentials, the utility knows that the EV
is trying to omit payments, and can thus levy a fine on the EV.
How high of a fine the utility levies is outside of the scope of
the protocol.
2) EV and PO Can Only Claim Correct Totals: Before
we prove correctness of Janus in the sense formulated at the
beginning of the section, we establish an important relationship
between receipts obtained by an EV and a PO upon charging.
For convenience, let us define the function Fee that extracts
the charging fee from the commitment in a receipt, i.e.,
Fee((m, C˜, σ)) = P where C˜ = Cmt(P ; R˜). (5)
Proposition VII.1 Consider the charging fees P ei committed
in C˜ei , and the charging fees P
p,u
j committed in C˜
p,u
j . There
exists a bijective mapping f between the set {(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) :
∀e ∈ E , 1 ≤ i ≤ M e} and the set {(mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) :
∀p ∈ P , 1 ≤ j ≤ Mp,u} such that Fee((mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i )) =
Fee(f((mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ))).
Proof: Consider an arbitrary receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) of an
arbitrary EV e. Without loss of generality, assume EV e
obtained this receipt in session (e, p, u, i, j). Observe that
the price validation phase for charging session (e, p, u, i, j)
starts with P ei = P
p,u
j . EV e then binds its credential τi
to the two commitments Cei = Cmt(P
e
i ;R
e
i ) and C
p,u
j =
Cmt(P p,uj ;R
p,u
j ). Since PO j also knows the commitment
opener Rei and R
p,u
j , it can verify that the EV indeed binds
its credential to the two commitments Cei and C
p,u
j instead
of to some other commitments of different values. Therefore,
when the PO relays the EV’s zero-knowledge proof pi to
the utility, it is guaranteed that both PO p and EV e agree
on the price P ei = P
p,u
j committed in C
e
i and C
p,u
j . Since
the PO must relay the zero-knowledge proof pi in order for
the price validation protocol to complete, and since the EV
and the PO can only obtain their receipts when the price
validation completes, we are guaranteed that for the charging
session (e, p, u, i, j) the price committed in C˜ei of the EV’s
receipt (mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) must be equal to the price committed
in C˜p,uj of the PO’s receipt (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ). By defining
f((mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i )) = (m
p,u
j , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ) for each charging ses-
sion (e, p, u, i, j), we obtain the desired bijective mapping.
We can use the existence of a bijective mapping between
receipts and commitments to prove the correctness of Janus.
Proposition VII.2 Janus is correct in the sense that it allows
the utility to verify that P e =
∑Me
i=1 P
e
i for each EV e and
P p,u ≤
∑Mp,u
j=1 P
p,u
j for each PO p ∈ P .
Proof: We give an indirect proof for the correctness of
Janus, which it achieves using homomorphic commitments
that are signed by the utility. Consider an EV e that dur-
ing the reconciliation phase submits a total of M e
′
receipts
(mei , C˜
e
i , σ
e
i ) where 1 ≤ i ≤ M
e′ . From the reconciliation
phase it is clear that EV e can only claim a total fee that
is equal to the sum of the charging fees committed in the
commitments {C˜ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ M}. If the EV attempts to
replace C˜ei with another commitment C
′ = Cmt(P ′;R′) with
a different charging fee P ′ 6= P ei , it must forge the utility’s
signature σ′ on (mei , C
′), which is infeasible given the security
of the ACL signature [5]. Since C˜ei is a commitment of P
e
i ,
this guarantees that the claimed total is P e =
∑Me′
i=1 P
e
i . Note
that, so far there is no guarantee that the number of receipts
M e
′
submitted by EV e is equal to the number of charging
sessions M e that the EV actually participated in. To guarantee
that M = M e, Janus requires the EV to reveal all unused
credentials during the reconciliation phase. As discussed in
Section VII-B1, this prevents EV e from intentionally omitting
one or multiple individual charging fees in the calculation of
the total fee. Given that P e =
∑Me′
i=1 P
e
i and that M
e′ =M e,
we have P e =
∑Me
i=1 P
e
i , which proves the first part.
The correctness of PO p’s total fee follows a similar
argument. PO p can only claim a total fee that is the sum of
a subset of the charging fees committed in the commitments
{C˜p,uj : 1 ≤ j ≤ M
p,u}. The PO cannot modify the value
P p,uj committed in C˜
p,u
j without invalidating the signature σ
p,u
j
on the pair (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j ). The PO has to support its claimed
total fee using a series of receipts (mp,uj , C˜
p,u
j , σ
p,u
j ). Each
receipt proves to the utility that some EV, whose true identity is
unknown to the utility, has agreed on the fee that is committed
in C˜p,uj . The utility can verify that the total fee claimed by
the PO is indeed the sum of all of the fees committed in the
homomorphic commitments C˜p,uj that the PO submits, without
learning the value of the individual fees themselves, which
proves the second part. PO p can thus claim at most an amount
of P p,u =
∑Mp,u
j=1 P
p,u
j .
Note that Janus does not prevent a PO from underclaiming
the total fee, e.g., by intentionally omitting one or more
receipts in the calculation of the total fee. Nonetheless, since
in our billing model the PO does not receive payment directly
from the EV but from the utility that aggregates the dynamic
charging activities of the EVs during the past billing cycle,
underlaiming the charging fee would only cause financial
damage to the PO. A rational PO would thus not attempt to
underclaim the total charging fee.
C. Location Privacy
If a utility has a single EV as customer then the aggregate
information is clearly enough for the utility to invade the
location privacy of the EV, i.e., to infer the charging sections
the EV visited. In what follows we are interested in whether the
utility can infer the set of charging sections that a particular
EV visited, and possibly the fee for each possible charging
session of an EV, in more likely scenarios.
For the analysis recall that
∑
e∈E M
e =
∑
p∈P M
p,u =
M , and let us consider a particular outcome of charging
sessions of EVs e ∈ E at POs p ∈ P . We can model this
by a bipartite multigraph G = (E ,P ,S), where S is the set of
edges, which contains an edge (e, p) for every charging session
of EV e at PO p. Observe that G has parallel edges if any EV
had multiple charging sessions at the same PO.
Without a priori information about the charging fees,
inferring the EVs’ location can be formulated as finding the
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(number of) bipartite multigraphs (E ,P ,S) that satisfy∑
e∈E
1S((e, p)) = M
p,u ∀p ∈ P (6)
∑
p∈P
1S((e, p)) = M
e ∀e ∈ E , (7)
and that allow a feasible vector of payments (P(e,p)) to the
problem ∑
p∈P
P(e,p) = P
e, ∀e ∈ E (8)
∑
(e,p)∈S
P(e,p) = P
p,u. (9)
Constraint (6) corresponds to the number of charging sessions
of PO p, (7) to the number of charging sessions of EV e, (8)
ensures that the total fee of each EV is allocated, and (8)
enforces a feasible allocation of fees between EVs and POs.
In the worst case every bipartite multigraph that satisfies (6)
and (7) allows a feasible vector of payments. The following
result shows that if each PO provides charging sessions to
sufficiently many EVs then the number of feasible bipartite
graphs grows exponentially.
Proposition VII.3 The number of bipartite graphs that satisfy
(6)-(7) is lower bounded by(
M
|E||P|
)Ω(|E||P|)
. (10)
Proof: To obtain the number of bipartite multigraphs
satisfying the above constraints, let us consider the biadjacency
matrix of a bipartite multigraph, i.e., the non-negative integer
valued matrix of size |E| × |P| whose entry (e, p) is the
number of parallel edges between vertices e and p. Every
bipartite multigraph satisfying (6) and (7) has a biadjacency
matrix whose row sum for row e is M e and column sum for
column p is Mp,u. Finding the feasible bipartite multigraphs
is thus equivalent to finding the non-negative integer valued
matrices of size |E| × |P| with row sum sequence (M e)e∈E
and column sum sequence (Mp,u)p∈P . While it is known that
a feasible matrix can be found in polynomial time, counting
the number of feasible matrices is known to be #P-hard even
for |E| = 2 [11]. Furthermore, if the matrix is dense, i.e.,
mine∈E{M
e} = Ω(|P|) and minp∈P{M
p,u} = Ω(|E|), then
the number of bipartite graphs can be lower bounded by [6]
(
M
|E||P|
)Ω(|E||P|). (11)
The above result shows that the search space grows expo-
nentially with both the number of EVs and the number of POs.
For example, suppose there are a total of 104 EVs and 10 POs,
and each EV participates in 2 charging sessions on average per
day. Suppose the billing cycle is 30 days, then there will be
a total of M = 6 ∗ 105 charging sessions in the billing cycle.
To consider all feasible bipartite graphs, i.e., which EV visited
which PO for how many times, the utility needs to search
in a space of ( 6∗10
5
104∗10 )
Ω(104∗10) ∼ 610
5
. Thus, without a priori
information about the charging fees Janus provides a high level
of location privacy when there are sufficiently many EVs and
POs.
To evaluate the case when the utility does have a priori
information we now consider the case when a PO charges the
same amount for every charging session. To consider this case
it suffices to introduce the additional constraint
P(e,p) = P
p,u/Mp,u ∀(e, p) ∈ S, (12)
i.e., the fee of a charging session at PO p is always P p,u/Mp,u.
Proposition VII.4 The problem of finding a bipartite graph
and a feasible vector of payments that satisfy (6)-(9) and (12)
is NP-hard.
Proof: It is easy to see that the problem defined by (6)-(9)
and (12) corresponds to the sized multiple subset sum problem,
which is a generalization of the sized subset sum problem [10].
The sized subset sum problem consists of a list of positive
integers (the charging fees of the POs, one integer per charging
session), a positive integer P e, and a positive integer parameter
M e. The objective is to decide whethere there is a sublist of
size M e of the integers that sums to P e. The sized subset
sum problem is W[1]-hard [10], i.e., its complexity increases
exponentially in the parameterM e, and is exactly the problem
of assigning charging sessions that satisfy (8) to an EV e. Since
the problem has to be solved for all EVs simultaneously, the
problem (6)-(9) and (12) is a generalization of the sized subset
sum problem and is thus NP-hard.
To summarize, without a priori information it is the number of
feasible bipartite graphs that makes privacy invasion infeasible,
while with a priori information it is the computational com-
plexity. An analysis of the complexity of identifying charging
sessions under different priors is a topic on its own right, and
is beyond the scope of this paper.
VIII. DISCUSSION
To put Janus into a context, we continue with a discussion
of topics related to the design of Janus.
A. Comparison with Electronic Toll Pricing
If we regard each dynamic charging section as a toll road,
then electronic toll pricing protocols [4], [15], [18] can be used
in dynamic charging. However, to the best of our knowledge,
most electronic toll pricing protocols require random spot
checks to combat the malicious behavior where the vehicle
drives through the toll road without running the protocol,
e.g., by switching off the vehicle’s on-board communication
device. Random spot check incur additional maintenance cost,
e.g., deployment of patrol cars, and may also raise fairness
issues in certain cases, e.g., short-term rental car service. Janus
does not rely on random spot check at all to detect payment
omission. One important difference between the scenario of
dynamic charging and that of electronic toll pricing is that,
in electronic toll pricing, even if the vehicle does not own the
proper authorization and does not authenticate itself, it can still
drive on the toll road segment (unless there is a physical gate
enforcing proper payment before entry). To combat driving on
toll roads without proper authentication and payment, plate-
reading cameras could capture the plate number of violating
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vehicles and the driver would be responsible for paying a fine.
However, in the dynamic charging scenario, authentication
between the EV and the charging pads must complete before
the EV’s battery can be charged. If the EV chooses to turn off
its communication device and does not authenticate with the
charging pads, but simply drives through the dynamic charging
section, it is not a violation because the charging pads will
simply not charge the EV’s battery, and there is no loss for
either the pad owners or the utility. Janus utilizes the fact that
the EV must authenticate itself before battery charging, and
effectively binds authentication with payment: the EV must
first prove to the pad owner its authorization by spending the
single-use anonymous credential obtained from the utility. The
anonymous credentials serve as both an authentication token
and a binding of the dynamic charging fee to the payment
token.
B. Comparison with Direct Billing Model using Digital Cash
An alternative billing model for dynamic charging might
be for the EV to directly pay the PO using digital cash for
each dynamic charging session. Anonymous digital cash such
as Zerocoin [16] or Zerocash [20] can be used to implement
the financial transaction between the EV and the PO. One
might argue that, given the possibility of digital cash, it is not
necessary to have billing protocol for the subscription-based
billing model.
One drawback of using digital cash under the direct billing
model is that the EV must pre-load funds into its account
and make sure that the account has sufficient balance before
entering the charging section, and the EV may thus run out
of funds at inconvenient times. This problem does not exist
in the subscription-based billing model that Janus is designed
for, where the EV does not need to pre-load funds, and makes
the actual payment only at the end of the billing cycle.
Note that the subscription-based billing model and the di-
rect billing model described above are not mutually exclusive.
Just like a store may accept both credit card and cash payment,
a PO may accept both direct payment using digital cash and
indirect payment using Janus. It is thus important to clarify the
distinct advantages provided by the subscription-based billing
model. The subscription-based billing model, however, enables
flexible pricing plans that are not provided by the direct billing
model, e.g., the EV can purchase a plan of 1000 miles from the
utility and use dynamic charging anywhere anytime to recharge
its battery up to 1000 miles of total driving distance.
We also note that Janus is designed specifically for dynamic
charging scenarios, whereas digital cash is designed for more
general scenarios, and thus there are certain features that
a digital cash scheme can provide but Janus cannot. For
example, a digital coin can be transferred multiple times
among different entities, whereas in Janus the EV can only
spend a credential τ once, and can only spend it with the
utility. Nonetheless, because of the generality that digital cash
aims to provide, it generally involves more complex designs
than Janus. Anonymous digital cash designs may require even
more complex cryptographic operations or zero-knowledge
proofs to guarantee anonymity during spending. This may
result in longer execution time of digital cash operations. For
example, the Zerocash [20] design involves a zero-knowledge
succinct non-interactive argument of knowledge (zk-SNARKs)
that takes more than 2 minutes to generate on a platform
with Intel Core i7-2620M 2.7GHz CPU and 12GB RAM. In
comparison, the zero-knowledge proof pi used by Janus takes
less than 0.4 seconds to generate on the portable Raspberry Pi 2
platform with significantly less computational power (900MHz
CPU and 1GB RAM).
C. Trust relationship between EV, Pad Owner, and the Utility
We finally discuss our assumption concerning the trust
relationship between the EV, the PO, and the utility. Our
billing model is a subscription-based model, in that the EV
subscribes to the utility and receives a monthly bill aggregating
all its dynamic charging usage from the utility. This requires
the EV to trust the utility to make the correct calculation. In
Janus, since the EV knows the ground truth of the dynamic
charging fee for each charging session, it can easily verify
if the total price in the monthly bill is correct. The utility
can verify that the EV does not omit any payment token,
and each payment token is authorized by some PO. However,
the trust relationship between the EV and the utility does not
automatically imply that the EV should give up its location
privacy to the utility. Janus protects the EV’s location privacy
by not allowing the utility to infer the fee of a particular
individual charging session from the payment tokens submitted
by the EV.
To a certain extent, Janus assumes more trust relationship
between the EV and the PO. This is reflected in the design
where the PO effectively acts as a proxy between the EV and
the utility: the EV does not directly communicate with the
utility during the price validation phase; instead, the PO relays
the credentials of the EV to the utility and the payment token
from the utility to the EV. We justify this design choice by
the observation that the PO is able to physically observe the
EV. By our definition, the PO operates the dynamic charging
section, and if the EV drives over the dynamic charging
section, the corresponding PO inevitably observes the EV. We
thus argue that the billing protocol, which works within the
cyber space, cannot prevent the PO from revealing the EV’s
location and identity to any other entity in the physical space,
and the billing protocol must assume that the PO will not reveal
the EV’s location information. As a consequence, mechanisms
are needed to discourage a PO from revealing the EV’s identity
and location to a third party, whether or not Janus is used. The
design of such mechanisms is outside of the scope of the paper.
D. Charging Fee Negotiation
Janus assumes that the EV and the PO are able to negotiate
charging fees for each dynamic charging session. The problem
of charging fee negotiation is orthogonal to the problem space
of Janus, whose major goal is to allow verifiable aggregation
of per-session charging fee into total charging fee without
compromising the EV’s location privacy. The EV and the PO
may negotiate charging fee for the incoming dynamic charging
session according to various pricing policies, e.g., fixed-rate
pricing, day-ahead pricing, real-time pricing, etc., and the exact
policy and negotiation protocol used by the EV and the PO is
not our concern in this paper.
Janus requires the EV and the PO to negotiate charging fee
and complete the price validation phase prior to the charging.
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Note that once the price validation phase completes, the PO
already obtains the receipt that it can use to claim money from
the utility. In particular, a malicious PO may complete price
validation with the EV but refuses to charge the EV. One might
suggest that the PO should first charge the EV’s battery, and
only after the dynamic charging finishes do they run the price
validation phase. However, this alternative design choice would
allow a malicious EV to freeride the dynamic charging service
by simply not running the price validation phase after it has
received electricity from the PO. The question of whether price
validation should complete before or after the actual charging
is thus related to the question whether the EV or the PO is more
likely to behave maliciously. We made the design choice where
the EV and the PO complete price validation before the actual
charging for the following reasons: (i) this is consistent with
our assumption that the EV fully trusts the PO; (ii) a malicious
PO is more likely to be caught, since the dynamic charging
section is a physical road segment that does not move, and if
the PO is reported of behaving maliciously, e.g., not charging
the EV’s battery after price validation completes, the utility
or some other authority could send their own EVs to collect
evidence; and (iii) in the scenario where multiple POs co-exist
in the area and compete with each other, a PO not honoring
the negotiated charging amount is likely to lose customers.
Another advantage of having the EV complete price vali-
dation phase with the PO prior to charging is authentication.
Recall that in the price validation phase, EV e must spend a
single-use anonymous credential τei . The PO is able to verify
that the credential is spent correctly, which in turn tells the
PO that this EV is valid and indeed subscribes to the utility.
If the EV fails to spend an unused anonymous credential, the
PO considers the EV as unauthenticated and will simply not
charge the EV’s battery at all.
IX. RELATED WORK
Several recent works proposed to improve the privacy of
electronic toll pricing services using on modern cryptographic
solutions [4], [15], [18]. A common feature shared by these
designs is that the vehicle is required to periodically broadcast
certain information that can be used later by the authority
to calculate its bill. The challenge is to make sure that the
information disclosed during the periodic broadcast and the
bill calculation process do not violate the vehicle’s location
privacy. In VPriv [18] the vehicle periodically broadcasts
tags whose commitment the vehicle has registered with the
authority. To calculate the bill, the authority sends to the
vehicle the prices associated with each tag that the authority
has received from any vehicle, and the vehicle calculates the
total price using the prices corresponding to its own tags.
The authority and the vehicle then engage in a two-party
protocol where the vehicle proves either of the following:
i) the tags used in the calculation are valid; or ii) the total
price is calculated correctly with respect to the tags. The
two-party protocol can be executed multiple times to improve
the authority’s confidence that the vehicle’s bill is calculated
correctly. Unlike VPriv, PrETP [4] does not use two-party
computations. Instead, the vehicle periodically broadcasts a
homomorphic commitment of the price corresponding to the
current road segment. During the bill calculation phase, the
authority combines all the individual commitments of the
vehicle to obtian a commitment of the total fee; the vehicle
calculates the total fee and proves to the authority that it knows
the opening to the commitment of the total fee. To guarantee
that an EV would faithfully broadcast the information required
by the protocol, both VPriv and PrETP rely on random spot
checks, and if the vehicle is physically observed at certain time
and location, the vehicle is responsible for providing the proof
that the toll price corresponding to that time and location is
included in the total fee correctly. Milo [15] improves PrETP
by considering the possibility that multiple vehicles collude
and share the location of random spot checks with each other,
and uses blind identity-based encryption to guarantee that the
vehicles would not be able to learn these random spot check
locations. In Spectre [9], the vehicle is given certain amount
of Chaum’s e-cash [7] as tokens, and periodically broadcasts
tokens while driving (each token can be spent only once). At
the end of the billing cycle, the vehicle submits all unused
tokens, and pays for the tokens spent on the road.
As explained in Section VIII-A, the common disadvantage
of VPriv, PrETP, Milo, and Spectre is that they all rely on ran-
dom spot checks to guarantee that the vehicle is following the
protocol faithfully. The random spot check incurs additional
cost for the authority, and to some degree violates the vehicle’s
location privacy as well. Janus differs from existing toll pricing
protocols in that it does not require random spot checks to
enforce proper payment. Instead, it requires the EV to spend
one single-use anonymous credentials per-session, and the PO
will only charge the EV’s battery after the EV has spent the
credential and completed the price validation phase.
A handful of other recent works apply modern crypto-
graphic tools to provide privacy-preserving payment for other
transportation scenarios. Au et al. [2] proposed a privacy-
preserving payment scheme with revocation for static charging
of electric vehicles based on the BBS+ signature [3]. The
solution proposed in [2] assumes that the EV maintains a
balance and pays directly to the charging station, whereas
Janus is designed for the subscription-based billing model,
where the EV only makes the actual payment, indirectly
through the utility to the POs, at the end of the billing cycle.
Kerschbaum et al. [14] proposed a privacy-preserving billing
mechanism for public transportation. However, the application
scenario in [14] assumes that the user must tap a special cash
card at the gate before entering or exiting the transportation
system (e.g., the user must tap a card to enter the turnstile at
train station), and that the user will add value to the cash card
at a designated machine from time to time. Such assumptions
make it difficult to apply the solution directly to our case,
where the EV does not stop to tap a card before entering or
exiting a charging section.
X. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented Janus, a privacy-preserving
billing protocol for dynamic charging of electric vehicles.
By using blind signatures with attributes and homomorphic
commitments, Janus allows the utility to verify that the total
payment of the individual EVs and the total fee that the
PO should receive are calculated correctly, but it does not
allow the utility to learn the dynamic charging fees and
locations of individual charging sessions. Our Python-based
implementation indicates that the computational and commu-
nication complexity of Janus is low enough to make it a
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practical solution for privacy-preserving billing for dynamic
charging. Our analysis of location privacy based on aggregate
information indicates that in practical scenarios it will be a
combination of computational complexity and the cardinality
of the set of candidate solutions that helps preserve location
privacy. Nonetheless, it is open question how much information
a utility could learn over several billing cycles using an
intersection attack. This question is of general interest as it
concerns all privacy-preserving protocols that allow a party to
learn aggregates about a set of individuals.
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